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Introduction
Ever since Solow's (1957) growth model has been 'augmented' by human capital, the growthenhancing role of human capital accumulation has been recognized. The pioneering empirical studies by Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) focused on the educational dimension of human capital, yet it has been known for long that human capital can also be accumulated by improving the health status of the population (Schultz, 1961 , Mushkin, 1962 ). Weil's (2007) paper is the most recent in a chain of studies that have affirmed the growthenhancing role of health capital formation empirically.
On the other hand, Weil (2007 Weil ( : 1295 also suggests that health's positive effect on GDP is strongest among poor countries. For rich countries, the existing empirical evidence on whether health capital formation stimulates GDP growth at all is mixed. For instance, while , 1999b , 2003 find a positive effect of health expenditure growth on productivity growth for OECD countries, Owen (1995, 1997) as well as
McDonald and Roberts (2002) reject the hypothesis that life expectancy is a statistically significant explanatory variable for productivity growth in high-income countries. Bhagrava et al. (2001) even estimate a negative effect of the adult survival rate on economic growth for the US, France, and Switzerland. 1 Acemoglu and Johnson (2006) reach a similar conclusion.
A possible reason why the impact of health capital formation on GDP growth might turn negative in the process of economic development is offered by Baumol's (1967) model of 'unbalanced growth'. According to this model, imbalances in productivity growth between a 'progressive' (manufacturing) sector and a 'nonprogressive' (services) sector lead to perpetual expenditure shifts into the latter. As a consequence of these expenditure shifts, the growth rate of overall GDP will decline. Interestingly, Baumol singles out the health sector as a cardinal example for an industry beset by which has to become known as the 'Cost disease'.
So far, the 'health and growth'-literature -focusing on the compelling supply-side arguments in support of a growth-enhancing role of health capital formation -has largely ignored the adverse structural change effect that Baumol (1967) calls attention to. On the other hand, the literature on structural change -for which Baumol's model of unbalanced growth is one of its cornerstones -has recently discovered health capital formation as a 3 possible 'cure' for 'Baumol's (Cost) Disease'. 2 My aim in this paper is to bring these two strands of literature together and to investigate the causal relationship between health capital formation and GDP growth empirically. The empirical part of the paper focuses on rich countries because, for one thing, the growth-stimulating effect of health capital formation in poor countries is uncontested and, for another thing, 'Baumol's Disease' is a phenomenon that affects mainly developed economies. The econometric methodology I will use -the (dynamic) panel Granger causality framework -is relatively new and has (to the best of my knowledge) not been applied to study the relationship between health capital formation and economic growth before.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces Baumol's model of unbalanced growth and discusses some theoretical and empirical controversies around it.
Section 3 goes on to survey the state of the (empirical) 'health and growth'-literature. Section 4 opens up the empirical part of the paper introducing the data and methods to be used in the estimations, especially the methodology of (dynamic) panel Granger causality tests. Section 5 presents the results of the causality analysis including results of some robustness checks, and section 6 concludes.
Baumol's model of 'unbalanced growth' revisited
William J. Baumol's (1967) article 'Macroeconomics of unbalanced growth' is widely regarded as a major contribution to the literature on structural change. Whereas the first champions of the 'tertiarization hypothesis', Allan Fisher (1935) and Colin Clark (1940) , traced back the gradual shift in production from the agricultural to the manufacturing sector and onwards to the services sector mainly to changes in demand, Baumol offers a supply-side explanation. 3 In a nutshell, his model tells the following story. Productivity growth is higher in the 'progressive' (secondary) than in the 'nonprogressive' (tertiary) sector, but wages grow more or less the same in both sectors. Therefore, unit costs and also prices rise much faster in the tertiary sector than in the secondary. Demand for certain services, like health care for instance, is hardly price-elastic, hence consumers are willing to pay the higher prices.
Therefore, an ever higher share of total expenditures will be channeled into the services sector -hence the 'Cost disease'. Also, since aggregate productivity growth is a weighted average of the sectoral productivity growth rates with the weights provided by the nominal value added shares, the aggregate productivity growth rate will decline over time as the sector with the low productivity growth receives an ever-increasing weight. Thus, Baumol's model of unbalanced growth predicts a tendency for per-capita output in mature economies to stagnate.
The model is based on one fundamental assumption, namely that 'regular' growth in labor productivity can only occur in the 'progressive' sector. It is important to understand what the term 'regular' here means. For Baumol, regular productivity growth is the result of technological innovation which manifests itself in new capital goods. Capital goods are also responsible for economies of scale, being another source of productivity growth. Regular productivity growth is thus defined to depend on certain technological requirements. In the service industries, Baumol argues, and also in agriculture and construction, physical capital cannot be employed on the same scale as in manufacturing. These industries he therefore relegates to the 'nonprogressive' sector. 4 Baumol does not claim that increases in labor productivity are impossible in the 'nonprogressive' sector, only that this sector comprises "activities which, by their very nature, permit only sporadic increases in productivity" (Baumol, 1967: 416) . In his model, Baumol abstracts from productivity increases in the 'nonprogressive' sector for simplicity.
Another simplifying assumption for the model is that labor is the only factor of production. Baumol (1967: 417) admits that this assumption is "patently unrealistic", yet it can be seen as a consequence of his basic assumption mentioned before because in the simplest version of the model, the 'nonprogressive' sector uses no capital. The employment of capital in the 'progressive' sector Baumol captures -at least over time -by postulating that labor productivity in this sector grows at an exogenous rate.
Next, Baumol assumes that nominal wages in both sectors are related in the long run. He simplifies further and assumes that they are equal. His final assumption is that nominal wages (in both sectors) rise to the same extent as labor productivity in the 'progressive' sector. This implies that the price level in the 'progressive' sector stays constant, whereas it rises in the 'nonprogressive' sector in order to keep the level of real wages in line with the productivity 4 In the face of the all-round use of medical technology, the relegation of health care to the 'nonprogressive' sector may seem odd. Baumol points to the fact, however, that health care differs from manufacturing in that capital is here normally not used as a substitute for labor. "The bulk of our municipal expenditures", he writes, "is devoted to education which … offers very limited scope for cumulative increases in productivity. The same is true of police, of hospitals, of social services, and of a variety of inspection services. Despite the use of the computer in medicine …, there is no substitute for the personal attention of a physician …" (Baumol, 1967: 423) . The issue of productivity growth in the health sector is also discussed in Hartwig (2008b) .
5 level. The workers, regardless in which sector they work, buy goods and services from both sectors so that their respective real wages converge.
Equations (1) and (2) formally describe the production functions of the two sectors. Labor productivity in the 'nonprogressive' sector (1) stays constant, whereas it grows in the 'progressive' sector (2) at the constant rate r. Thus, output in the two sectors (Y 1 and Y 2 ) at time t is given by:
with L 1 and L 2 as quantities of labor employed in the two sectors and a and b as constants.
According to one of the assumptions just mentioned, the nominal wage (in both sectors) is given by:
with W as an arbitrary starting value.
Equation (3) completes the model of 'unbalanced growth' already. This simple model has a couple of interesting implications which Baumol draws out. First, the 'Cost disease':
equations (4) and (5) show that costs per unit of output in the 'nonprogressive' sector (C 1 ) tend towards infinity while they stay constant in the 'progressive' sector (C 2 ).
Relative costs also tend towards infinity (C 1 / C 2 = be rt / a). Under 'normal' circumstancesthat is when prices rise in proportion to costs and when demand is price-elastic -the 'nonprogressive' sector will vanish. Baumol (1967: 421) invokes craftsmanship, fine restaurants, and theatres as examples of establishments that have either disappeared or retreated to luxury niches as a consequence of customers' unwillingness to tolerate the price increases that would have been necessary to cover rising costs.
Yet parts of the 'nonprogressive' sector produce necessities for which the price elasticity is very low. Baumol calls attention to education and health care as prime examples. To show what happens in these industries as a consequence of 'unbalanced growth', Baumol assumes that the relation of real output of the two sectors remains unchanged as in (6):
is the labor force, it follows:
and
From (7) and (8) Then, if we insert (7) and (8) into (9) 
We can calculate the growth rate of real GDP as:
It follows that over time (t → ∞) the GDP growth rate drops asymptotically to zero ceteris paribus.
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Whether this assumption is valid has been investigated in a large body of empirical studies. Until recently, the empirical evidence was all but unanimously favorable to Baumol's model. Rowthorn and Wells (1987) , Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997) , Scarpetta et al. (2000) , Wölfl (2003 Wölfl ( , 2005 , and ECB (2006) are just a few examples for comparative multicountry studies that found productivity growth in manufacturing to be higher than in the aggregate of service industries. Fixler and Siegel (1999) confirm this finding in U.S. data.
However, on the basis of a new dataset for the U.S., Triplett and Bosworth (2003 , 2004 have raised doubts whether this 'stylized fact' is valid any longer. Taking output data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis' (BEA) industry output and input program and measuring labor input with BEA's series on persons engaged in production (full-time equivalents), Triplett and Bosworth (2004, Hartwig (2006 Hartwig ( , 2008a argues. In fact, Bosworth and Triplett (2007) repeat their earlier calculations with revised U.S. National Accounts data and find their result of a higher productivity growth in the services sector than in the goods sector reversed.
As was mentioned in the introduction, Pugno (2006) has recently presented a challenge to
Baumol's stagnationist outlook for the overall economy that does not rely on the possible non-validity of Baumol's fundamental assumption. Pugno argues that education and health care -the two services that Baumol (1967) uses as prime examples for 'nonprogressive' activities 7 -are on the other hand major contributors to the accumulation of human capital.
Pugno hypothesizes that the growth-stimulating effect of health capital formation could even overcompensate the adverse sectoral shift effect when it comes to GDP growth. The next section shows that in the face of the existing empirical evidence, Pugno's optimism might seem warranted.
Health capital formation and economic growth -a review of the literature
As was mentioned in the introduction, the notion of health as a component of human capital has been introduced in the early 60s already. In the famous Grossman (1972) model, the individual's desire to invest in his or her (depreciating) health capital stock explains the demand for health care. The growth literature has in turn identified investment in human capital as a driver of economic growth. So, not surprisingly, a number of studies have tried to determine the hypothesized contribution of health capital formation to growth empirically.
The first problem to solve in this literature is to measure health capital formation adequately. As can be seen from Table 1 , which summarizes characteristics and results of a number of relevant studies in this field in chronological order, there are two main approaches. 8 Sixty percent of the studies rely on some measure of life expectancy or the adult survival rate in order to proxy health capital formation; another third choose health care expenditures (HCE) as a measure. 9 For the present study, I prefer the HCE approach for two reasons. First, health economists commonly trace back the lion's share of the increase in global life expectancy to factors such as economic development, better nutrition, and improvements in environmental conditions (where they have occurred) rather than to health care utilization (cf. Getzen, 1997 : 330, Henderson, 1999 : 142, Santerre and Neun, 2000 : 69, Folland, Goodman and Stano, 2001 . Therefore, to proxy health capital formation with advances in life expectancy would loosen the link between health capital and health care that exists, for instance, in the Grossman model. Secondly, of course, by identifying health capital formation with health expenditure it is possible to build a bridge to Baumol's model of unbalanced growth, which predicts expenditure shifts towards the 'nonprogressive' sector.
< Insert Table 1 around here >
If we focus on the five studies in Table 1 that use measures of health expenditure as a proxy for health capital formation, we notice that all of them find a significantly positive impact of health capital formation on economic growth. 10 The same is true for the rest of the studieswith the exception of Webber (2002) 11 -when the full sample of countries is considered, although, as has been mentioned in the introduction, results (not shown in Table 1 ) are 9 sometimes different for the group of developed economies. Nevertheless, concerning the matter of dispute this paper sets out to resolve -whether health care expenditure growth through its impact on human capital formation fosters economic growth or, conversely, whether it leads to stagnation because it is the result of a 'Cost disease' that adversely affects the structure of the economy -the existing empirical evidence seems to support the former view.
However, if we take a closer look at the five studies mentioned, it appears that they do not yet provide enough evidence to close the case. All these studies use an augmented Solow growth modeling framework, which, in a cross-sectional design, does not allow for causal inferences. The positive contemporaneous association of GDP and HCE growth may be the result of 'reverse causation', as it is well known from the broad literature on the determinants of health care expenditure growth (recently summarized in Hartwig, 2008b ) that GDP -or national income, respectively -is a very robust explanatory variable for health care expenditure. 12 Admittedly, Heshmati (2001) and Rivera and Currais in their various publications test for endogeneity using the Hausman (1978) test, yet no clear picture emerges.
While Heshmati (2001) and Rivera and Currais (2004) cannot reject the hypothesis of exogeneity for health care expenditure, , 1999b , 2003 do find evidence for endogeneity and account for that by using instrumental variables in their estimations. It is unclear, however, whether the variables they propose as instruments are indeed appropriate since -as was just mentioned -the literature offers very little guidance as to the determinants of HCE growth (other than GDP growth). Also, Rivera and Currais' instrumental variables (IV) estimations are based on a cross-section of 24 OECD countries hence the number of observations is very limited. 13 At any rate, there still seems to be room for further research into the nexus between health care expenditure and economic growth. The present study aims at providing new evidence on the causal links between these two variables.
In comparison to the earlier studies, more observations and a different methodology will be used. The next section will introduce the data as well as this different methodology, which is the (dynamic) panel Granger causality testing approach.
12 Hoffmeyer and McCarthy (1994: 67) and Roberts (1999: 459) even suggest that GDP is the only robust determinant of health care expenditure that health economists have been able to uncover.
13 Heshmati's (2001) 
Methodology and data
Baumol's model of unbalanced growth predicts that structural change will cause the GDP growth rate to decline over time. Periods of strong increases in health care expenditure (HCE) are seen as episodes in which both employment and expenditures shift to a sector -or, insofar as HCE growth is symptomatic for an all-round 'Cost disease' -to sectors with low productivity growth. Later periods should then be characterized by lower GDP growth.
Otherwise, if Pugno (2006) (Granger causality running from X t to Y t can be tested in the same way.)
More recently, the notion of Granger causality has found its way into panel econometrics.
Most of the papers that have employed a panel Granger causality framework since around the beginning of the new millennium have investigated the causal nexus between certain variables and economic growth. For instance, there are papers that focus on 'investment and growth' (Attanasio, Picci and Scorcu, 2000, Podrecca and Carmeci, 2001) or, more narrowly, on 'foreign direct investment and growth' (Nair- Reichert and Weinhold, 2001 , Laaksonen-Craig, 2004 , Hsiao and Hsiao, 2006 . The panel Granger causality approach has also been used to study the relationship between exports and growth (Chao and Buongiorno, 2002, Kόnya, 2006) , agriculture and growth (Tiffin and Irz, 2006) , social security and growth (Lee and Chang, 2006) and financial development and growth (Hurlin and Venet, 2004 , Miyakoshi and Tsukuda, 2004 , Al-Awad and Harb, 2005 . As far as I see, the present paper is the first to apply the panel Granger causality methodology to the field of 'health and growth'.
Since the methodology of panel Granger causality testing is not implemented identically in the literature just reviewed -for instance, not all papers impose the restriction that the 11 coefficients of the lagged X t and Y t variables are the same for all cross-section members -a few more words are necessary about how the method will be implemented here. First, as is quite standard in the literature just reviewed as well as in the broader literature on economic growth, the HCE and GDP level data will be transformed into five-year average annual growth rates (geometrical means) in order to eliminate the cyclical component. As the
Granger causality tests require the data to be stationary, the resulting time series will be tested for the presence of unit roots, applying a battery of now standard panel unit root tests. When these tests fail to detect unit roots, the panel estimation models can be set up, for which the restriction of identical coefficients of the lagged X it and Y it variables will be imposed. Thus, I
will estimate a time-stationary VAR model adapted to a panel context (as in Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen, 1988) of the form:
.
X it and Y it are the five-year averages of the growth rates of per-capita GDP and HCE, respectively. N countries (indexed by i) are observed over T periods (indexed by t). I allow for country-specific effects µ i . The disturbances u it are assumed to be independently distributed across countries with a zero mean. They may display heteroscedasticity across time and countries, though.
It is common in Granger causality studies to test whether causation runs in both directions. So although the main focus of this paper is on testing whether HCE growth
Granger-causes GDP growth -and if so, with which sign -I will also estimate the equation:
14 It will be interesting to see whether the panel Granger causality methodology confirms health economists' 'stylized fact' that GDP is a significant explanatory variable for health care expenditure.
15
14 The assumptions are the same as for equation (14). 15 As far as I see, the only two studies in this field of research that have used the Granger causality approach so far are the papers by Devlin and Hansen (2001) and Erdil and Yetkiner (2008 Estimating equations (14) and (15) with pooled OLS presents an endogeneity problem since if the dummy variables (country-specific effects) affect GDP growth in (14) and HCE growth in (15) in one period, they presumably affected them in the previous period also (cf. Nickell, 1981) . The first step into the direction of correcting this endogeneity problem in dynamic panels is to take the first difference of all variables and to thereby eliminate the individual effects. Still, there remains a correlation between the lagged dependent variable, which is now in differences, and the error term. Arellano and Bond (1991) have shown that the best way around this problem is to use lags of the dependent variable from at least two periods earlier (in levels) as well as lags of the right-hand side variables as instruments in a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest to difference the instruments instead of the regressors in order to make them exogenous to the fixed effects. This leads from the 'difference' GMM to the 'system' GMM estimator (cf. Roodman, 2006) . In the next section, I will present results using the OLS, Arellano-Bond one-step system GMM, and Arellano-Bond two-step system GMM estimators. For the latter, the finite sample correction recently proposed by Windmeijer (2005) will be applied.
Based on the estimation results, a conclusion on causality will be reached by running
Wald tests on the coefficients of the lagged Y t 's to check whether they are jointly statistically different from zero.
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Data on health care expenditure are taken from the OECD Health database (in the version of October, 26, 2007) . This database also contains demographic and economic entries so that all data needed for the purpose of the present paper can be gathered from this source. GDP -leading to a rise in the share of HCE in nominal GDP. This is precisely the 'Cost disease' point of view. 18 The next section will go on to present the results of the causality analysis, including results of some robustness checks.
Empirical results
A reasonable first step in empirical analysis is a visual inspection of the data. Figures 1 and 2 show the histograms of the per-capita GDP and per-capita HCE growth rates -both deflated by the GDP deflator -for my sample of 21 OECD countries. Obviously, health care expenditure has outgrown GDP. The median growth rate of real per-capita HCE is 3.6 percent, whereas the median growth rate of real per-capita GDP is only 2.2 percent.
< Insert Figures 1 and 2 around here >
Both per-capita GDP and HCE growth exhibit one large positive outlier. Ireland's per-capita GDP has grown by an amazing 8 ½ percent per year on average over the period 1995-2000.
Even more extreme is Portugal's health expenditure growth between 1970 and 1975, a period in which real per-capita HCE more than doubled in this country. Outliers like these suggest that, as a robustness check, equations (14) and (15) should not only be estimated for the full sample of countries, but also by dropping each of the 21 countries in turn. Results of this robustness test will be presented below.
In order to test for Granger causality between GDP and health care expenditure, it is necessary that the two time series are stationary. Unfortunately, the available panel unit root tests are mainly designed for panels where both the time dimension and the cross section 18 Health economists have indeed identified an 'excess health care price/cost inflation' (Huber, 1999) dimension are relatively large. 19 In panels such as mine with a time dimension of only 7 observations, the analysis can proceed only under restrictive assumptions like, for instance, dynamic homogeneity. This has to be kept in mind when interpreting the results of panel unit root tests reported in Table 2 . 20 As the table shows, the tests reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity for both variables. For what they are worth, these test results at least do not speak against proceeding to the Granger causality tests.
Since Granger causality test results are sensitive to the choice of lag length m in the timestationary VAR model given by equation (14), it is important to specify the lag structure appropriately. I follow Miyakoshi and Tsukuda (2004) in estimating equation (14) with OLS and basing the choice of the optimal lag length on the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). Table 3 shows that -based on this criterion -the optimal lag length is two. Table 3 around here > Table 4 shows the results for estimating the VAR model (14) with OLS, with the ArellanoBond one-step system GMM estimator and with the Arellano-Bond two-step system GMM estimator, respectively. 21 The OLS specification includes country-specific fixed effects (random effects were rejected by the Hausman test for correlated random effects.) The GMM specifications include period-specific effects. Lags of the dependent variable from at least two periods earlier as well as lags of the per-capita HCE growth variables serve as GMM-style instruments. 22 For the two-step estimator, the small sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005) has been implemented.
< Insert

< Insert Table 4 around here >
The bottom of the table reports specification test results for the GMM estimations. The
Sargan test is a test on whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term u it (which they must be in order to be valid instruments). Table 4 shows that the null hypothesis is 19 For a detailed account of panel unit root tests, cf. Breitung and Pesaran (2008) . 20 The table reports results for the panel unit root tests available in EViews. The estimations for this paper were done either with EViews (v. 6) or with Stata (v. 9). 21 The Arellano-Bond one-step estimator uses the identity matrix as a weighting matrix. The two-step estimator weighs the instruments asymptotically efficient using one-step estimates. 22 Roodman's 'xtabond2' command was used in Stata (v. 9) for the GMM estimations; and Roodman's (2006) examples geared my handling of the syntax.
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accepted. 23 Note, however, that it is necessary to 'collapse' the set of instruments in order to achieve that the Sargan test accepts the over-identifying restrictions in the GMM estimations.
While in the standard instrument matrix each instrumenting variable generates one column for each time period and lag available to that time period, Roodman (2006) proposes to 'collapse' the instrument set into a single column to limit the instrument count. This option is available in Stata (v. 9) and has been used here. The Arellano-Bond test accepts the hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation in the disturbances of the first differenced equation.
The estimations consistently find negative coefficients for lagged per-capita health care
expenditure. The second lag is always statistically significant. In the (OLS and) ArellanoBond one-step estimation(s), the Wald test rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients of lagged per-capita HCE are jointly equal to zero. If they aren't, then growth in real per-capita health care expenditure Granger-causes real GDP growth with a negative impact.
There are at least two ways of interpreting this result. First, it could be seen as providing evidence against the model of endogenous growth that Pugno (2006) defends. In the standard neoclassical (exogenous) growth model, negative coefficients for the human capital variable are perfectly plausible within a Granger-causality framework. Starting from a steady state, a positive shock to health capital formation should boost GDP growth in the same time period.
Later periods should then be characterized by lower growth as the growth rate falls back to its steady state level. Of course, while in the standard Solow model technological progress ensures that the steady state growth rate can remain positive, Baumol shows that when we assume 'unbalanced growth' in a two-sectoral model, the per-capita GDP growth rate will drop to zero despite technological progress (in the 'progressive' sector).
If we choose to stick to the endogenous growth model, however, then the finding of negative Granger-causality running from per-capita HCE to per-capita GDP growth undermines Pugno's (2006) conjecture that health capital formation might have cured the 'Cost disease' through its growth-stimulating effect (which overcompensates the adverse sectoral shift effect). This statement carries over to the Arellano-Bond two-step estimation which, although it does not find negative Granger-causality running from HCE to GDP growth at conventional significance levels, does not find any positive Granger-causality that would support Pugno's claim. Based on the evidence Table 4 reports, the research question 23 The Sargan statistic, which is the minimized value of the one-step GMM criterion function, is not robust to heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation. The Hansen statistic (which is the minimized value of the two-step GMM criterion function) is robust.
that motivated this paper, namely whether health capital formation has cured 'Baumol's Disease', has to be answered in the negative.
Skeptics might object to the methodology employed to derive this result that it rests on the assumption that all information not included in the stationary VAR model is irrelevant.
However, this assumption could be defended here on the grounds that the list of robust determinants of economic growth is not very long. Sturm and de Haan (2005) , for instance, find only real capital formation and a couple of regional dummies (that are not relevant for my sample of OECD countries) to be significant and robust explanatory variables for GDP growth. To account for their findings, I added lagged per-capita growth in fixed investment to model (14) as a control variable. This didn't change the coefficients and Wald test results for HCE growth qualitatively.
Yet, there is still the possibility that the results Table 4 presents are driven by outliers. To check the robustness of these results, I therefore re-estimate equation (14) dropping each of the 21 countries in turn. Table 5 shows that the results are indeed to some extent sensitive to the exclusion of Portugal and Ireland. The Wald test nevertheless rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients of lagged per-capita HCE are jointly equal to zero at the 5 percent level.
< Insert Table 5 around here >
To conclude the empirical analysis, I test for Granger-causality running from GDP to HCE.
As has been mentioned before, GDP -or national income, respectively -has been identified as the most important and robust explanatory variable for health care expenditure by health economists. Table 6 shows the results for estimating the VAR model (15). 24 As in the previous estimations, the GMM specifications include period-specific effects; and lags of the dependent variable from at least two periods earlier as well as lags of the per-capita GDP growth variables serve as GMM-style instruments. Again, the set of instruments was 'collapsed'. Still, the Sargan test does not accept the over-identifying restrictions at the 5 percent level. The Hansen test, however, does. The Arellano-Bond test clearly accepts the null of no second-order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals.
As can be seen from Table 6 , the coefficients of lagged per-capita GDP are always positive and significant. The Wald test rejects the hypothesis that they are jointly equal to zero at conventional significance levels. Hence we can conclude that per-capita GDP growth
Granger-causes per-capita HCE growth with a positive sign. This finding -which is robust to 24 The Schwarz Information Criterion again suggests lag length two.
the exclusion of countries from the sample (cf. Table 7 ) -supports the existing literature on the determinants of health care expenditure growth. Tables 6 and 7 around here >
< Insert
Conclusion
The research question this paper poses -whether health capital formation has cured 'Baumol's (Cost) Disease' -can clearly be answered in the negative. No evidence was found that health capital formation through health care expenditure -that is the mechanism highlighted by the famous Grossman (1972) model -Granger-causes per-capita GDP growth with a positive sign in OECD countries. On the contrary, when per-capita GDP growth is regressed on its own lags and on the lags of per-capita health care expenditure in a panel
Granger-causality testing framework, the coefficients for the lagged HCE growth are consistently negative. The statistical significance of the negative coefficients is not robust to the choice of the estimator (Arellano-Bond two-step vs. Arellano-Bond one-step system GMM), however.
When the other direction of Granger-causality -that is Granger-causality running from per-capita GDP growth to per-capita HCE growth -is tested, the results support health economists' long-standing 'stylized fact' that GDP determines HCE with a positive sign. My findings thus support the idea of some kind of self-stabilizing control cycle between GDP and health care expenditure. According to this idea, the strong HCE growth that occurred during the 50s and 60s in many OECD countries subsequently led to a decline in GDP growth because of the adverse structural change effect highlighted by Baumol's model. Declining GDP growth in turn attenuated HCE growth, and, as a consequence, GDP growth could rebound. This mechanism might help to understand why HCE growth in OECD countries declined temporarily in the 80s − a fact that Barros' (1998) model was unable to explain.
So how are my results related to the conventional wisdom that health is generally a good thing for economic growth? 25 First, it has to be remembered that my sample of countries consists of OECD countries only. Earlier studies (mentioned in the introduction to this paper) have occasionally also been unable to determine any positive influence of health on economic growth in rich countries. This does not mean that my results necessarily carry over to poor countries for which 'Baumol's Disease' will not become acute for a long time yet. Secondly, 25 Weil (2007 25 Weil ( : 1266 Baumol's model of unbalanced growth, namely that the process of raising certain input levels (such as health and education) can imply structural change that is unfavorable for overall economic growth might vanish in the estimates of total factor productivity growth. 26 For example, it might be the case that the health variable (life expectancy) has a positive sign in an estimated production function, but that a positive shock to health expenditure -even if it improves life expectancy -lowers total factor productivity to an extent that overcompensates the effect of the rise in health status on growth. Nevertheless, the positive sign of the health variable may mislead policymakers. To preclude this possibility, future research should find ways to cross-validate the conclusions of cross-country growth studies based on the aggregate production function approach. The Arellano-Bond one-step GMM estimator was applied. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Estimates for constant terms not shown. The Arellano-Bond one-step GMM estimator was applied. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Estimates for constant terms not shown.
